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We examine the transmission process of the policy rate to the lending and deposit rates in Greece for 
the period 1996-2004 within bivariate cointegration and error correction framework. A significant 
structural break takes place with the accession of Greece into EMU in 2001. The bank rates become 
much more responsive to the policy rate in terms of impact multipliers and speed of convergence to the 
equilibrium, a consequence of the common monetary policy. However, the process is still not complete 
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1. Introduction 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is understood as an area with common 
monetary and exchange rate policy aiming at common economic objectives, such as 
liberalization of capital and labor movements, monetary and financial integration and 
elimination of the fluctuations of exchange rates of the participating member states. 
For the time being, and still under the gradual integration process, the convergence of 
the interest rates in the EMU makes many authors to believe that asymmetries in the 
monetary policy shocks will tend to disappear.  
 
Across to this framework an interesting question is how shocks of the policy-
controlled interest rate are propagated in the deposit and lending rates. This 
propagation / transmission is a part of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Monetary transmission mechanism is a core issue in modern macroeconomics 
because it helps understanding the interaction between the real and the monetary 
sector of the economy. Its main question is how a change in a nominal variable, e.g. 
the interest rate, is translated into changes in output, prices and employment. We may 
identify two fundamental stages in this mechanism. In the first stage the reaction 
function, i.e. the function that determines the short run policy-controlled interest rate, 
is derived under optimization conditions given the optimal growth and inflation mix. 
Given the determination of this policy rate, we now ask how the changes in this rate 
are propagated in the rest interest rates. The process is usually called in the economic 
literature pass-through of interest rates or interest rate transmission. In the second 
stage we ask how the changes in these interest rates are translated into changes in 
output, prices and employment. This second stage is described by means of the   3
channels of monetary policy. Here we focus on the first stage, and, in particular, on 
the transmission from the policy-controlled interest rate to the retail rates. 
 
Various studies referring to European countries have been concerned with the 
transmission from the policy-controlled interest rate to the retail rates, see, inter alia, 
Mojon (2000), Sander and Kleimeier (2000, 2001, 2004), Angeloni and Ehrman 
(2003), Toolsema et al (2001), Burgstaller (2003), Bredin et al (2001), Petursson 
(2001), De Bondt (2003). From these studies one can realize the following: stickiness 
in the transmission process, non-completeness at least in some cases, significant 
variations across countries and indications of convergence after the introduction of the 
single currency on 1/1/1999 and the creation of the EMU. 
 
In this paper we continue the above line of research in the interest rate transmission 
dynamics and focus, in particular, on Greece. We ask how the shocks of the policy-
controlled interest rate are transmitted to deposit and lending rates in Greece during 
the last eight years. Greece has been a participating member since 2001 and its 
monetary policy is conducted in line with the ECB targets. Therefore, an interesting 
question is whether there has been a structural break after the EMU (by this we mean 
the period after the accession of Greece to EMU in 1/1/2001) in comparison to the 
pre-EMU period. To our knowledge, the propagation mechanism from the policy rate 
to the lending and deposit rates and the issue of a possible structural break after the 
EMU in Greece have not been dealt with. For example, the study by Mylonidis and 
Nikolaidou (2001) is referring to the testing of expectation hypothesis of the term 
structure of interest rates with Greek money market data up to October 2001, but no 
reference is made to the propagation of the policy rates to the lending or deposit rates.   4
In this paper we make use of the most recent available data, up to September 2004, 
and we address the following questions: 
 
What is the impact multiplier in lending and deposit rates before and after EMU? Is 
the process completed and how long does it take for completion? Is there any 
structural break in the transmission dynamics after the accession of Greece into 
EMU? 
 
In brief, our findings are that a completely new situation is coming into view after the 
EMU: the impact multipliers are now active and the speed of convergence to the new 
equilibria is very fast. However, the transmission is not complete. If our null 
hypothesis is that there is no structural break after the EMU, this clearly cannot be 
maintained on the basis of our statistical findings. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a summary of findings in 
the literature. In Section 3 we describe the data and the statistical framework to be 
employed. Section 4 discusses the transmission in the lending and deposit interest 
rates. The paper concludes in Section 5. 
 
2. Studies on the Transmission Dynamics of Interest Rates 
A common element found by all researchers is the stickiness of the interest rates.  
Stickiness simply means that a change in the policy interest rate, controlled by the 
Central Bank, is not propagated immediately to the retail rates (lending and deposit). 
Thus, these retail rates respond later, and in some cases, to a lesser degree than the 
initial impulse on the policy interest rate. In these cases the process is characterized as   5
incomplete.  Three issues have been the subject of theoretical and empirical research 
on the interest rate transmission, (Toolsema et al, 2001). First, the theoretical 
explanation on the interest rate stickiness. Agency costs due to asymmetric 
information (adverse selection and moral hazard), (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), 
adjustment costs (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994), switching costs (Klemperer, 1987) 
and risk sharing (Fried and Howitt, 1980) are the four theoretical contributions to the 
interest rate stickiness. Second, the degree of stickiness across countries. Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994) show a significant difference in the degree in both impact and 
long run multipliers across EMU countries. A similar view is obtained from the 
studies of Borio and Fritz (1995), Kleimeier and Sander (2000), Donnay and Degryse 
(2001) and Toolsema et al (2001). Further, issues of asymmetric propagation seem to 
arise, depending on whether there is a positive or negative impulse on the policy rate 
(see, inter alia, De Bondt, 2002; Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 2000) or whether the 
rates are below or above their equilibrium level (Hofmann, 2000; Kleimeier and 
Sander, 2000). Third, the relationship between interest rate stickiness and the financial 
system. Despite of the adoption of the common currency in the EMU area, significant 
differences still exist across EMU countries in their financial system (Mojon, 2000). 
These differences may be attributed to heavy investments in brand names which are 
country specific, networks of branches and different marketing policies, (Gual, 1999), 
and different setting and legal expertise (Cecchetti, 1999).  
 
Although different statistical methodologies have been applied, involving different 
data sets, countries, time periods and underlying assumptions, most authors seem to 
agree on the following results, see, inter alia, Burgstaller, 2003. First, a high degree 
on stickiness of retail lending rates. For example, in the EMU area, only 30% of the   6
change on a given market rate is passed to the lending rates within a month. Second, 
strong empirical evidence for significant differences among EMU area. Third, the 
average full adjustment of the retail rates to market rates varies between 3 and 10 
months (De Bondt, 2002). Fourth, the final pass-through of market retail rates is 
typically complete or, in some cases (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994) even more than 
complete, reaching 110% and the speed at which the market rates are completely 
transmitted to retail rates can vary between 3 months and 2 years.  
 
3. Data Set, Statistical Methodology and Some Preliminary Tests 
The data set comprises of three interest rates series, called policy, lending and deposit 
rates. The lending rate concerns short run loans to enterprises and the deposit rates 
concern deposits from households. Both rates are of one year maturity. We use 
monthly data covering the period July 1996 up to September 2004, that is, 99 
observations in total. This period has been chosen for two reasons. First, it is this 
period when money market starts to function and becomes important in Greece, and, 
second, interest rates prior to this period were principally administered by the Central 
Bank and show no variation for long periods. Thus, statistical estimates from series 
without variation would not be meaningful. An important issue arising here is which 
of the various interest rates that the Central Bank identifies as instruments will be 
used as a proxy for the policy rate. We have selected the money market rate to be used 
as the policy rate since this rate is the one which is more strongly correlated with 
monetary policy as a whole (Donnay and Degryse, 2001). The policy-controlled 
interest rates we examine here intend to cover refinancing operations of one and three 
months. The rates are expressed on annual basis. Preliminary experimentation (not 
shown in this research) of these two money market rates (of one and three months),   7
with the lending and deposit rates, shows that it is the rate of one month which 
possesses slightly better properties in terms of statistical adequacy. Therefore, we 
have chosen the interest rate of one month as our policy rate. More on the sources of 
data is given in the Appendix. 
 
The paper employs bivariate cointegration methods and the associated Error 
Correction Model (ECM) for the estimation of parameters.  A theoretically possible 
alternative would be to employ the Johansen’s cointegration framework. However, 
given the bivariate nature of our examined relationship, Johansen’s procedure would 
reveal at most one cointegrating vector, which is also the case within our proposed 
single-equation framework, described below. If the bank rate (lending or deposit) 
forms a linear long run relationship with the policy rate, a possible structure is the 
following equilibrium model 
01 tt t BR M θθ ε =+ + . 
Short run dynamic adjustments (assuming one lag) are possible with the following 
disequilibrium model 
01 2 13 1 tt t t t BR M M BR γγ γ γ ξ −− =+ + + + . 
However, due to non-stationarity frequently encountered in the applied research, an 
estimable model in the analysis of interest rate dynamics is in the error correction 
form. This is known in the literature as the Granger Representation Theorem 
(Granger, 1987). This estimable form is the Error Correction Model (ECM), which is 
a reparameterization of the disequilibrium model taking into account the long run 
model. In particular, in a dynamic setting governed by possible non-stationarity and 
provided that cointegration exists, the ECM avoids the issue of spurious regression,   8
ensures orthogonality among regressor, and allows parameters estimation in a 
statistically valid fashion. Our ECM has the form 
11 2 1 3 1 () ( 1 ) ttt t t BR M M BR u δγ γ γ γ −− ∆= + ∆ + + − − + , 
where  t BR is the bank rate (lending or deposit) and  t M is the policy rate.  0 θ and  1 θ  
are long run parameters to be estimated from the equilibrium model. ∆ is the 
difference operator and  123 ,,, δγ γ γare short run parameters to be estimated. The 
parameter  1 γ  is the impact multiplier. The long run parameters, estimated from the 












respectively. In all these models we assume that the stochastic perturbations  t ε ,  t ξ  
and  t u  are i.i.d. processes. Given these assumptions, the estimates from the ECM are 
consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
 
If the transmission process is complete then the long run parameter equals 1, that is, 
1 1 θ = , or  1 '1 θ = , and all the change in the policy rate will be transmitted to the 
bank rate, although, in practice, it will take some months for the process to be 
completed. If  1 1 θ <  or  1 '1 θ < , then the process is incomplete, i.e. not all the 
change in the policy rate is transmitted to the bank rate. Finally, if  1 1 θ >  or 
1 '1 θ > , then the bank rate change is even higher than the policy rate change. We 
experimented with several model structures, within the class of the ECMs, with 
various ARMA components and dummy variables to account for the shift of the 
regime in January 2001. Our final estimates are given in Tables 2 – 6. 
  
As it is customary in empirical analyses, we examine the dynamic properties of the 
employed interest rate series. We are interested if they are stationary or not, and if not,   9
what their data generating processes are. Two means of analysis are employed: visual 
display of the series and their autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, 
and formal unit root testing. Figures 1 and 2 show the graphs of the rates and their 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. It is obvious from these graphs 
that the series appear to be non-stationary and downward trending. To establish the 
non-stationarity property of the series, we proceed to formal unit root testing, i.e. 
ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) tests with several 
combinations of constant, and constant with a trend. Since these tests are sensitive to 
the deterministic components (constant and trend) and the selected lag length, we 
used a variety of optimal length information criteria such as AIC (Akaike) and SIC 
(Schwartz). Our experimentation verifies the visual impression: all the series are 
indeed non-stationary governed by one unit root process, and in some cases with a 
drift. The message from the above is that all series are integrated of order one, a result 




A next step in the analysis is to see if these series are cointegrated, that is, if the bank 
rate (lending or deposit) form a stable long run linear relationship with the policy 
controlled rate. It is only in this case that ECM provides statistically sound and 
economically interpretable parameters estimations. On the basis of cointegration test 
and the Granger critical values (Engle and Granger, 1987; Engle and Yoo, 1987, 
Table 3), and from the cointegrating Durbin Watson (CRDW) statistic, both shown on 
the Table 1, it turns out that our two regressions form a stable long run linear 
                                          
1 Unit Root Tests: The ADF t statistics (-2.87 for the policy rate M1, -1.56 for the lending rate LD and 
-1.66 for the deposit rate DP) are not significant at the conventional significance levels (5% and 10%). 
All the series are non stationary with one unit root. The AIC has been employed for the determination 
of the optimal lag length. 
   10
relationship, marginally, though, at 10% significance level. Therefore, we proceed to 
the ECM estimation. Tables 2 and 4, present the estimates of the ECM for both 
interest rates equations. 
 
4. The Transmission Dynamics: Findings 
The preceding statistical analysis leads to the following findings: We may identify 
two periods of interest rate dynamics: the period prior to EMU, 1996:07-2000:12 and 
the period 2001:01 – 2004:09, i.e. the period after the accession into EMU. In both 
periods there is a common property: the downward trend in all interest rates, although 
with very different speeds. Given the downward trends, a comparison of the interest 
rates between these two periods by means of simple averages would not be sensible. 
Instead, we prefer to fit a linear trend as an approximation of the downward 
movements of the interest rates. These regressions show that the downward trend is 
fast in the period prior to EMU, while in the second, it is clearly of much lower speed, 
almost of zero speed. For example, the lending rate downward trend was -0.22 
percentage units per month before the EMU and just -0.02 after the EMU. For the 
deposit rates the figures are -0.10 and -0.04, respectively. The very low speeds in the 
second period, for both retail rates, imply a sort of convergence, a finding in 
accordance with the European integration literature. Table 7, shows the estimates of 
the trends. 
 
Further, both lending and deposit rates seem to form a long run relationship with the 
money market policy rate, marginally, though, at 10% significance level. This is 
established on both the cointegrating Durbin Watson and the cointegration ADF test.   11
The interest rate of one month is correlated somewhat more strongly with both retail 
rates than the rate of three months does.   
 
The statistical fitness of the ECMs for the whole period 1996:07 – 2004:09 is not 
particularly strong, especially for the lending rate. The 
2 R for lending rate equation is 
weak, just 0.16, while for the deposit rate 
2 R is 0.44. However, given that, in general, 
the fitness of the ECMs is not particularly high, 0.44 is considered satisfactory. To 
find a more precise indication of the fitness of the model for the two periods under 
consideration, we performed two separate regressions (not shown), instead of 
including dummies. We found that for both retail rates, the first period is 
characterized by very low 
2 R s, less than 0.10 in both cases, while, in contrary, in the 
second period 
2 R s are very satisfactory (0.70 for the lending rate and 0.77 for the 
deposit rate). A possible reason for this is that during the first period the transmission 
from the policy rate to the lending rate is quite noisy, reflecting low effectiveness of 
the policy rate as a means to influence the retail rates. The inclusion of dummy 
variables in the ECM equations (0 for the period before EMU and 1 after the EMU) 
improves the statistical adequacy of the model and reveals a structural break in the 
estimated parameters. This, of course, reflects the regime shift due to the accession of 
Greece in the EMU and the adoption of the ECB monetary policy guides since 
2001:01. The change in impact multiplier,  1 γ , is obvious. For the lending rate, the 
impact multiplier before EMU is 0.09, very low indeed, while after the EMU  1 γ  rises 
to 0.508. The same picture is emerged for the deposit rates. Before EMU,  1 γ  is 0.063, 
while after EMU it rises to 0.64. These are, in fact, very significant changes for both 
retail rates. Tables 2-6 present estimates and diagnostics of the estimated models. The 
estimates of the short run parameters are presented in Tables 2 and 4. The high   12
volatility of the interest rates in the prior to EMU period and the associated low 
fitness are shown in Figure 3. Diagnostics for the ECMs are presented in Table 6. No 
autocorrelation or ARCH effects are statistically significant at 5% s.l. However, the 
normality assumption of the residuals, on the basis of the Jarque-Berra statistics, is 
clearly rejected, probably due to non linearity frequently met in transition processes, 
see Figure 4. The stability of the coefficients is evaluated by the Cusum of Squares 
Test, shown on Figure 5. No parameters instability is apparent for both ECMs on the 
basis of the test. 
  
For the long run multipliers we provide two different ways of estimation. The first is 
by means of the equilibrium model (the static, cointegrating regression) while the 
second is by means of the error correction model. We have denoted these two long 
run multipliers by  1 θ and  1 ' θ , respectively. For the lending rate before the EMU, for 
example, the long run multiplier obtained from the ECM is 1.86, while the same 
multiplier obtained from the static regression is 0.926. After the EMU, the figures are 
0.52 and 0.78, respectively. For the deposit rate and before the EMU, the multipliers 
are 0.50 from the static regression and 1.24 from the ECM. For the period after the 
EMU, these multipliers are 0.63 and 0.68, respectively, in fact identical. We may 
ascribe these differences of the estimates from the two models in the noisy and non-
effective transmission mechanism (reflected by low 
2 R s) before the EMU. In the 
period after the EMU, the estimates from the two models are close, as it is expected 
from the econometric theory, given the consistency of the ECM estimates and the 
superconsistency of the cointegrating vector properties. Therefore, concluding that the 
process is more complete in the first period, due to higher long run multipliers, is 
rather misleading, due to low explanatory power of the models involved for this   13
period. We think that direct comparison of the multipliers for both periods should be 
done cautiously. See Tables 1 and 5 for the estimates from the static regression, and 
Tables 2 and 4 for the estimates from the ECM. 
 
The dynamic adjustments towards equilibrium are very different in the two periods. 
We perform a simulation on the assumption that a negative 100 basis points shock 
takes place.  The simulation is conducted with the aid of the short run disequilibrium 
model whose parameters  123 ,,, δγ γ γ have been obtained indirectly from the ECM, 
(Tables 2, 4). For example, for the lending rate, in the first period, we assume that the 
equilibrium policy rate is 11.4 (the average in the period) and due to the negative 
shock, the new equilibrium value of the lending rate, on the basis of the long run 
parameters  0 ' θ and  1 ' θ obtained indirectly from the ECM, will be 10.8. The dynamic 
adjustment from the initial value of 11.4 to the new value 10.8 will last about 70 
periods, an extremely long period for the working of the monetary policy. This 
reflects the ineffectiveness of the monetary policy for the influence of the policy rate 
to the lending rate. For the lending rate again, the situation is completely different in 
the after EMU period. The speed of convergence is very fast. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the speed of convergence depends critically on the 
precision we wish to have. If, for example, we want a precision with two decimal 
points for our new equilibrium value, then the full convergence is, of course, of lower 
speed. We think, however, that a precision with one decimal point is satisfactory in 
practice. Given this assumption, the transmission is complete within 3 months. The 
same picture is emerged from the dynamic adjustment of the deposit rate. After the 
EMU, the convergence is instantaneous.  Figure 6 shows the dynamic adjustments for 
the two interest rates before and after the EMU.    14
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the transmission process of interest rates in Greece, before and 
after the EMU, with monthly data from 1996:07 - 2004:09. As a policy rate we have 
chosen the one month interest rate. We study how the changes of the policy rate are 
propagated into the lending and deposit rates with maturity of one year. Our findings 
are consistent with the relevant literature, although not fully. Using a cointegration 
and error correction framework we find the following: First, downward trends are 
clear and fast before the EMU, while after the EMU downward trends are very slow, a 
consequence of the common monetary policy in the Eurozone area and an indication 
of convergence of the interest rates. Second, in the period before the EMU, and in 
common with all the relevant literature, the process is characterized by high 
stickiness, as measured by the impact multipliers, which in our data set is very low. 
The situation changes dramatically in the after the EMU period. Now the impact 
multipliers become indeed active. Third, as for the completion of the process, that is, 
the long run multipliers, the picture is not clear in the first period. In the second 
period, the estimates from the two models (ECM and the equilibrium model) are 
comparable for both interest rates. Here, still the process is not complete since the 
long run multiplier  1 θ  is less than one, being 0.52 for the lending rate and 0.63 for the 
deposit rate. That is, 100 basis points change in the policy rate will change the 
equilibrium lending rate by 52 basis points and by 63 basis points the deposit rate. 
This finding of the non-completion of the transmission process differs from the 
findings of most of the papers in the literature. Finally, we think that structural break 
due to the accession in the EMU is clear from our empirical evidence, despite any 
model drawbacks of statistical nature for the first period. The implications of the 
structural break are important. Interest rate transmission now works and monetary   15
policy has become an active tool since when the ECB is responsible for monetary 
policy. This is clearly the positive effect. On the negative side, the issue of the non-
completion still remains since the benefits of the monetary policy do not fully arrive 
at the final target groups, the debtors and depositors. It is probable, however, that if 
the intra-EMU credit mobility could be accelerated, the transmission process could 
also be complete at some later time. Concluding the paper, some other issues may be 
addressed for future research. For example, the propagation of policy rates, beyond 
the two rates we studied here, to other series of retail interest rates or bond yields. 
Also, instead of the one or three month interest rate as an instrument of the monetary 
policy, other similar rates could be tried. Another extension would be the possible 
interaction between the various rates and the feedback to the policy rates, by means of 
VAR models. Or, probably, asymmetries during the business cycle or asymmetries 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
The interest rate data set has been obtained from the Bulletin of Conjuctural 
Indicators, various issues, of the Bank of Greece. It is worth noting that several 
definitions and methods of computations have been applied to this data set over time, 
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Figures 














Note: M1: policy rate of one month, M3: policy rate of three months (not used in the regression 
functions), LD: Lending rate, DP: Deposit rate. 
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Figure 3: Actual and Fitted Values of the ECM 
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Figure 4: Residuals Histograms 
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Figure 5: Cusum of Squares Test 







01:07 02:01 02:07 03:01 03:07 04:01 04:07








01:07 02:01 02:07 03:01 03:07 04:01 04:07










   22
Figure 6: Dynamic Adjustments to Equilibrium after a 100 bp Negative Shock 
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Tables 
Table 1: Cointegration ADF Tests on the Residuals in the Static Regressions 
01 ˆˆ ˆ tt BR M θθ =+ ,  ˆ ˆtt t BR BR ε =− 
Residuals 
from 




LD regression  -3.938190  0.478090  No 
DP regression  -3.704290  0.315726  No 
The static regression for the lending rate on the one month money market rate, based on the ADF test, 
shows evidence of cointegration at the significance level (s.l.) 10%. The CRDW statistic shows 
cointegration at 5% s.l. The deposit rate, on the basis of the ADF test, is marginally cointegrated at s.l. 
10% with the one month money market rate. The conclusion is the same if we take into account the 
CDRW for the deposit rate. The critical value for the t statistics with  4 m = , sample size =100 and 
s.l. 10%  is 3.71.  
 
Table 2: Lending Rate: Estimates from the ECM 
Before EMU  After EMU 
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Table 3: Lending Rate: Estimates from the Cointegrating Equation 
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Table 4: Deposit Rate: Estimates from the ECM 
Before EMU  After EMU 
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Table 5: Deposit Rate: Estimates from the Cointegrating Equation 




















Table 6: Diagnostics of the ECMs 
Lending Rate Equation  Deposit Rate Equation 
2 R 0.16 
2 R 0.44 
DW 2.1  DW  1.99 
LM Serial Correlation (2 lags)F  0.134  LM Serial Correlation (2 lags) F 2.23 
ARCH (2 lags) F  2.78  ARCH (2 lags) F 0.919 
Jarque – Berra 869.74  Jarque – Berra 37.43 
Note for Tables 2-6: Parameters Estimates from the ECM and from the Cointegrating Equations. The 
short run parameters are estimated from the ECM 
11 2 1 3 1 () ( 1 )  . ttt t t BR M M BR four dummies u δγ γ γ γ −− ∆= + ∆ + + − − + +












respectively. The cointegrating vector is estimated from the cointegrating 
equation: 01   tt t BR M two dummies θθ ε =+ + + . 
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Table 7: Linear Trend Approximations: Estimates for λ  
Regression Equation:  tt BR t h φλ =+ + 
Lending Rate  Deposit Rate 
Period 1996:07 – 2000:12: λ= -0.22  Period 1996:07 – 2000:12: λ=-0.10 
Period 2001:01 – 2004:09: λ=-0.02  Period 2001:01 – 2004:09: λ= -0.04 
 